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INTRODUCTION 
Public health budgets and individual patients around the world struggle with 
high prices for pharmaceutical products. Difficulties are not limited to low-
income countries. Prices for newly introduced therapies to treat hepatitis C, 
cancer, joint disease, and other medical conditions are placing great strains on 
health budgets even within the wealthiest countries.1 In the United States, state 
pharmaceutical acquisition budgets are at the breaking point—or have passed it—
and treatment is effectively rationed.2 
Pharmaceutical products reflecting extraordinary price escalation are 
principally newly developed originator small-molecule and biological 
pharmaceutical (biologic) products.3 These products are typically protected by 
patent, regulatory market exclusivity, or both. There are also recent incidents of 
 
1. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-12, MEDICARE PART B: 
EXPENDITURES FOR NEW DRUGS CONCENTRATED AMONG A FEW DRUGS, AND MOST WERE 
COSTLY FOR BENEFICIARIES (2015); STEPHEN W. SCHONDELMEYER & LEIGH PURVIS, AARP  
PUB. POLICY INST., TRENDS IN RETAIL PRICES OF SPECIALTY PRESCRIPTION DRUGS WIDELY 
USED BY OLDER AMERICANS, 2006 TO 2013 (2015); Peter Loftus, Drug Firms Ring in Higher Prices, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2016, at B1; Andrew Pollack, Cancer Specialists Attack High Drug Costs,  
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2013, at B1; Matthew Herper, 115 Doctors Propose This Solution for Terrifying 
Cancer Drug Prices, FORBES ( July 23, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/
07/23/155-angry-doctors-propose-7-solutions-for-terrifying-cancer-drug-prices/#11eefa5b4f82 
[https://perma.cc/9HDE-D9FY]. 
2. See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 114TH CONG., THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, 106–10 (Comm. Print 2015) [hereinafter SOVALDI 
STAFF REPORT]; David Siders, Hepatitis C Drug’s High Cost Hits California Budget, SACRAMENTO 
BEE ( Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/article7058828.html 
[https://perma.cc/T7GB-W69V] (“Tucked inside Brown’s annual spending plan was $300 million 
for the cost of new hepatitis C drugs, including Sovaldi, the drug approved in December 2013. The 
single budget item—$100 million this fiscal year and $200 million in 2015-16—eclipses proposed 
general fund spending on state parks or on emergency drought response next year.”); 
SCHONDELMEYER & PURVIS, supra note 1, at 4. 
3. See, for example, FREDERICK M. ABBOTT & GRAHAM DUKES, GLOBAL 
PHARMACEUTICAL POLICY 2 (2009), for a discussion of pharmaceutical categories. Pharmaceutical 
products created through synthetic organic chemistry involve the combination of basic elements (i.e., 
carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, etc.) into more complex molecular structures or compounds, and 
ultimately into forms suitable for delivery to patients. Although such molecular structures may be 
complex from a chemical engineering standpoint, the drug compounds are smaller physical structures 
than the active elements of biological drugs, which are formed from biological materials that are 
substantially more complex than individual compounds and are of larger physical scale. See, e.g., 
Thomas Morrow, Defining the Difference: What Makes Biologics Unique, BIOTECHNOLOGY 
HEALTHCARE, Sept. 2004, at 24. For visual image of structures, see, for example, http://
www.nyas.org/image.axd?id=77f1c4ce-4897-416d-af15-fa717c188b1b&t=635316181685700000. 
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dramatically increased prices of certain generic products whose supplies are 
restricted for one reason or another, providing their suppliers with effective 
market exclusivity.4 
There are a variety of tools that governments may use to regulate the prices 
of pharmaceutical products, including those covered by patent or regulatory 
market exclusivity.5 Specifically, a government may impose price controls, grant 
compulsory patent licenses, or use monopsony purchasing power to force price 
concessions.6 Though they are currently used in one form or another by many 
countries, there can be political-economy obstacles to making use of these tools. 
Competition, or antitrust, law has rarely been used to address “excessive 
pricing” of pharmaceutical products.7 This is a worldwide phenomenon. In the 
United States, federal courts have refused to apply excessive pricing as an antitrust 
doctrine, either with respect to pharmaceutical products or more generally.8 
Courts in some other countries have been more receptive to considering the 
doctrine, but application in specific cases has been sporadic, including with 
respect to pharmaceuticals.9 
This remains a paradox of sorts. Competition law experts acknowledge that 
one of the principal objectives of competition policy is to protect consumers 
against the charging of excessive prices.10 Yet, there is a firm reluctance to 
recommend addressing excessive prices “as such.” A number of reasons are put 
forward for this reluctance. Not all of these reasons are terribly persuasive. The 
currently preferred alternative is to address the “structural problems” that allow 
the charging of excessive prices.11 That is, “fixing the market” so that the 
underlying defect by which excessive prices are enabled is remedied. 
 
4. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Turing Moves to Next Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2015, at B1; 
Anjali Cordeiro & Makiko Kitamura, Valeant Slumps as U.S. Prosecutors Issue Subpoenas on Prices, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 15, 2015, 1:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-
15/valeant-receives-subpoenas-from-u-s-prosecutors-on-drug-pricing. 
5. See, e.g., PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Zaheer-Ud-Din Babar ed., 
Springer Int’l Publ’g Switz. 2015) (including country contributions); OECD HEALTH POLICY 
STUDIES, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING POLICIES IN A GLOBAL MARKET (2008); U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE INT’L TRADE ADMIN., PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS IN OECD COUNTRIES 
(2004). 
6. See sources cited supra note 5. 
7. OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMM., EXCESSIVE 
PRICES (2012) (“This document comprises proceedings in the original languages of a Roundtable on 
Excessive Prices held by the Competition Committee (Working Party No.2 on Competition and 
Regulation) in October 2011”) [hereinafter OECD ROUNDTABLE]. The terms “competition” and 
“antitrust” are interchangeable in referring to a field of law. The term “antitrust” has traditionally 
been used in the United States because early cases involving anti-competitive business practices 
addressed a form of business combination known as a “trust.” That type of business combination is 
no longer associated with anticompetitive business practices, but the term “antitrust” continues to be 
used, primarily (though not exclusively) in the United States. 
8. See id. at 299. 
9. See id. at 10–11. 
10. Id. at 9. 
11. Id. at 227. 
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There is a fundamental problem with the “fixing the market” approach when 
addressing products protected by legislatively authorized market exclusivity 
mechanisms, such as patents, and regulatory marketing exclusivity. That is, 
mechanical aspects of the market are not broken in the conventional antitrust 
sense. Rather, the market has been designed without adequate control mechanisms 
or “limiters” that act to constrain exploitive behavior. Political institutions, such as 
legislatures, that might step in are constrained by political economy (e.g., 
lobbying), and do not respond as they should. 
The field of competition law is subject to limited substantive regulation at 
the multilateral level. 
Developing and developed countries have substantial flexibility within the 
existing international legal framework to adopt competition law approaches that 
are suitable to their circumstances and that are consistent with the fundamental 
objectives that competition law is intended to achieve. Expert commentators, 
myself included, have laid out the multilateral framework in which competition 
law operates in some detail elsewhere,12 and this Article does not revisit that 
exercise other than to observe the flexibility of the framework. Consistent with 
that earlier work, this Article recommends that emerging markets, and developing 
countries more generally, should be cautious in responding to suggestions that 
new competition rules at the multilateral level are needed. 
The U.S. competition authorities, and its multinational business community, 
have long resisted the negotiation of multilateral competition rules. 
Understandably, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 
wished to preserve their ability to adapt domestic antitrust policy and rules as 
perspectives and interests changed, particularly when these authorities anticipated 
that multilateral competition negotiations would reach a least common 
denominator result.13 Up until now, the business community has preferred to 
 
12. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Are the Competition Rules in the WTO TRIPS Agreement 
Adequate?, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 687 (2004); Frederick M. Abbott, Competition Law in Emerging 
Markets: The Virtue of Regulatory Diversity, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS 
IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR MITSUO MATSUSHITA 216 ( J. Chaisse & Tsai-Yu Lin eds., Oxford  
Univ. Press) (2016) [hereinafter Abbott, Competition Law in Emerging Markets]; Frederick M. Abbott, 
Public Policy and Global Technological Integration: An Introduction, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL 
TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION 3 (Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds., 1997) [hereinafter 
Abbott, Public Policy and Global Technological Integration]; Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property and 
Competition—Room to Legislate Under International Law, in UNDP, USING COMPETITION LAW TO 
PROMOTE ACCESS TO HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME 
COUNTRIES 35 (F. M. Abbott ed., 2014). 
13. See, e.g., Joel Klein, No Monopoly on Antitrust: It Would be Premature for the WTO to  
Seek to Enforce Global Competition Rules, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998, at 1, https://www 
.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/1998/229364.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4ML-7QEW] 
(“I continue to believe strongly that WTO negotiations on competition rules would be premature and 
could even be counterproductive.”); A. Douglas Melamed, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Antitrust Enforcement in a Global Economy, Address Before the 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute 25th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy 
12 (Oct. 22, 1998), http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-enforcement-global-economy 
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operate in a less regulated environment. But, there are signs that the multinational 
business community calculation is shifting as a consequence of the more 
aggressive and effective application of competition law by authorities in 
developing countries.14 The calculation may now suggest that the risks from being 
subjected to prosecution under competition law exceed the gains from operating 
in an unregulated environment. This is a self-interested calculation and does not 
represent a more benign perspective toward the protection of the consumer and 
public interest. Proposals to restrain the development of international competition 
norms should be understood in that context. 
Competition law and policy should develop robust doctrine to address 
excessive pricing in markets lacking adequate control mechanisms. This Article 
will focus specifically on the pharmaceutical sector because of its unique structure 
and social importance. This focus is not intended to exclude the possibility that 
development of excessive pricing doctrine would be useful in other contexts. 
This Article is divided into two parts. The first addresses competition policy 
and why it is appropriate to develop the doctrine of excessive pricing to address 
distortions in the pharmaceutical sector. The second addresses the technical aspect 
of how courts or administrative authorities may determine when prices are 
excessive, and potential remedies. 
I. EXCESSIVE PRICING DOCTRINE 
A. Philosophical Resistance 
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in the years shortly following enactment 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act placed protection of consumers at the center of the 
objectives of antitrust policy.15 By the late 1980s, the focus of competition policy 
in the United States had shifted to protection of competitive markets with a focus 
on assuring a competitive market environment among suppliers.16 This shift in 
focus from consumer to market protection reflected, at least in part, the influence 
of Chicago School economics emphasizing the self-correcting nature of markets,17 
and it was embedded in antitrust guidelines adopted by the Department of Justice 
 
[https://perma.cc/K4L7-WBWB] (“We do not believe, however, that it would make sense at this 
time to commence multinational negotiation of common antitrust principles or rules.”). 
14. See Abbott, Competition Law in Emerging Markets, supra note 12, at 217 (including 
reference to U.S. Chamber of Commerce report on China). 
15. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Frederick M. Abbott, The 
‘Rule of Reason’ and the Right to Health: Integrating Human Rights and Competition Principles in the 
Context of TRIPS, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 279 (Thomas Cottier et  
al. eds., 2005). 
16. See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps 
Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2405–06 (2013). 
17. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 
(1979); see also Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-
Based Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241, 243 (2012) (“The Chicago School of antitrust economics is 
not merely a set of normative prescriptions about antitrust law, such as to ‘let the market solve it.’”). 
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and Federal Trade Commission in the mid-1990s.18 The competitive market 
protection approach was and is thought to address the interests of consumers 
because, in theory, prices will be driven down to marginal cost in a competitive 
market. 
This philosophical market approach is reflected in recent judicial antitrust 
doctrine in the United States.19 There is a presumption that producers charging 
high prices (e.g., above marginal cost) will attract new market entrants that will 
eventually bring prices down. A producer that is able to charge a high price 
through astute business practices or innovation has earned that right, which free 
market economics encourages. Recent federal court decisions also express 
skepticism concerning the capacity of judges to determine what fair prices are, 
given that judges are not technical regulatory experts.20 
This basic philosophical approach may work to protect consumers in the 
general case, but its utility is limited in cases where the market is not designed to 
fluidly adjust. This is the case of the originator pharmaceutical market where 
products benefit from legislatively granted exclusive marketing rights. An 
originator pharmaceutical product (small-molecule or biologic) typically will 
benefit from patent protection that will last twenty-five years from the date of 
application (the ordinary twenty-year term, plus a five-year extension).21 Taking 
into account the lead time for regulatory marketing approval by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), the effective term of protection will be between ten 
and fifteen years.22 In addition to patent protection, the originator pharmaceutical 
product will benefit from a period of regulatory marketing exclusivity as a 
consequence of approval by the FDA. In the case of small-molecule chemicals, 
that regulatory exclusivity probably will not extend beyond the patent term.23 But, 
in the case of biologics, the twelve-year period of exclusivity may well extend 
beyond the duration of patent protection.24 
As a consequence of exclusive marketing rights (whether through patent or 
regulatory exclusivity), the originator pharmaceutical product is not subject to 
 
18. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (1997); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1995). 
19. See discussion of case law infra pp. 289–95. 
20. See infra notes 41–62 and accompanying text. 
21. See generally U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON 
BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/emerging-health-care-issues-
follow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-commission-report. 
22. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 
22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 164, 166 (2003). 
23. The U.S. market exclusivity provision applicable to small molecule chemicals was initially 
adopted in the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act, extended for five years from the FDA’s approval 
of marketing, and was expected to expire prior to the end of the patent term. It is now possible to 
obtain certain extensions of market exclusivity as a reward for conducting clinical trials with respect to 
new indications. This may allow extension beyond the term of the patent. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2016). 
24. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at vi. 
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competition from the “same product” during the term of protection from a 
juridical standpoint.25 In principle, this enables the originator to charge whatever 
price it decides upon without fear of competition. In practice, there are potential 
constraints on pricing. First, there may be pharmaceutical products that are 
reasonable substitutes even if they are not “the same,” and this introduces the 
element of potential price competition. Second, the price that the originator can 
charge will depend on demand for the product, which is influenced by the degree 
to which it is required by patients (or purchasers), and ultimately by the amount 
the patients (or purchasers) can afford to pay.26 
The maximum pricing power for the originator is manifest when it owns 
exclusive marketing rights for a unique or breakthrough therapy for a life-saving 
pharmaceutical product. If there is no reasonable substitute product, pricing 
power is effectively constrained only by the capacity of the patient or health 
provider to pay. An illustration is found in the pricing power enjoyed by Gilead, 
the originator-owner of sofosbuvir (Sovaldi) used for the treatment of hepatitis 
C.27 When Sovaldi was introduced in late 2013, it was a unique therapy successful 
in the treatment of hepatitis C. There was tremendous pent-up patient demand for 
the product. Gilead, with the advice of a team of investment bankers and 
pharmaceutical market specialists, took advantage of the situation to set a price of 
$84,000 for a twelve-week course of treatment and earned over $14 billion in the 
first year of sales.28 Gilead did not develop Sovaldi. The drug was initially 
developed by a smaller biotechnology company, Pharmasett, which Gilead 
purchased for $11 billion in 2011.29 Prior to its acquisition by Gilead, Pharmasett 
had been planning to introduce sofosbuvir at less than half the price eventually set 
by Gilead (approximately $35,000 for a course of treatment).30 Gilead purchased 
Pharmasett because its own research and development (R&D) efforts had failed. 
While the cost of production of Sovaldi is not the benchmark by which the 
originator price should be set, it is of interest that the cost of production for the 
course of treatment is $350 or less.31 
 
25. Id. 
26. Pharmaceutical products are ultimately used or consumed by individual patients, but the 
individual patient may not be the direct purchaser of the product. The purchaser may be a federal or 
state health provider, a private insurance provider that pays for all or a portion of the product, or 
some other entity. In many countries, government health department procurement authorities are 
among the largest buyers of pharmaceuticals. 
27. See SOVALDI STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 29. 
28. Id. at 17. 
29. Id. at 123. 
30. Id. at 19. 
31. See Jeffrey Sachs, The Drug That is Bankrupting America, HUFFINGTON POST  
BLOG (Feb. 16, 2015, 11:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-sachs/the-drug-that-
is-bankrupt_b_6692340.html [https://perma.cc/5Z4Q-SJ9K]. 
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The process by which Gilead set the price of Sovaldi makes for chilling 
reading from a public health standpoint.32 The executives at Gilead essentially set 
out to determine the maximum price that would stress the limits of political and 
public opinion, but not quite break it. This was with a clear understanding that the 
pricing of the drug would severely undermine state public health procurement 
budgets. Gilead has refused to furnish Congress with direct information regarding 
its cost of bringing the product to market, despite being requested to do so.33 
When Gilead introduced Sovaldi, it had strong reason to believe that 
reasonably comparable alternative treatments would be approved by the FDA and 
introduced by other originators within a year or two. In other words, there would 
be a temporal limit to its unconstrained pricing power. In fact, such products were 
introduced and, approximately one-and-a-half years following the introduction of 
Sovaldi, Gilead was forced to reduce the price significantly.34 It may be (and has 
been) suggested that this demonstrates that market forces will act to constrain 
pricing power. Yet it remains that Gilead charged an excessive price when it 
introduced the product, and for more than one year, and that even with the 
introduction of competition, the price for hepatitis C treatments offered by 
originators is very high and continues to threaten public health budgets. 
This is but one illustration of the general problem of pharmaceutical pricing. 
The price of a substantial number of anti-cancer drugs has drawn the attention of 
medical professionals that have called for legislative action to reduce prices.35 
Members of Congress have introduced a number of legislative proposals that 
would provide some form of control mechanism.36 State governments have been 
substantially more active than the federal government in adopting mechanisms 
intended to limit excessive pricing.37 However, each of these mechanisms is 
dependent on political processes that are subject to intervention by corporate 
lobbyists with interests in maintaining pricing power. The application of antitrust/
competition law by private or public parties is not dependent on legislative action. 
This Article is not specifically directed toward fixing a problem in the United 
States, though indeed there is a problem to be fixed. It is intended to more 
generally address the problem from a global competition law and policy 
 
32. For an explanation of how Gilead decided to set a price for Sovaldi, see SOVALDI STAFF 
REPORT, supra note 2, at 29–58. 
33. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted) (“Several months after Gilead agreed to buy Pharmasset, a 
Gilead executive described the acquisition as a ‘bargain.’ The company failed to provide sufficient 
information to determine how much additional cost it incurred to complete the development, finish 
the FDA approval process, and bring the drug to market.”). 
34. Id. at 112–16. 
35. See Pollack, supra note 1. 
36. See Bronwyn Mixter, Sanders to Introduce Wide-Ranging Drug Cost Bill, BLOOMBERG BNA 
PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.—DAILY ED. (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.bna.com/sanders-
introduce-wideranging-n17179935532/ [https://perma.cc/X9UY-WXEC]. 
37. See generally Nancy E. Morden & Sean D. Sullivan, States’ Control of Prescription Drug 
Spending: A Heterogeneous Approach, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1032, 1032–38 (2005) (discussing a number of 
methods states use to limit excessive pricing). 
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perspective. Developing and middle-income countries are in a more precarious 
position than the United States in terms of their capacity to fund pharmaceutical 
procurement. 
Competition law and policy experts recognize that there is a paradox in the 
reluctance of courts and administrative authorities to tackle the problem of 
excessive pricing directly. Part of that hesitation derives from a belief that it is 
overly difficult to determine what constitutes an excessive price, for which the 
logical predicate is determining what a reasonable price is. 
B. Jurisprudential Approaches 
In 2011, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Competition Committee convened a Policy Roundtable on excessive 
prices and published the contributed papers and dialogue.38 The Roundtable 
included contributions from major antitrust authorities, including from outside the 
OECD, and represents an authoritative compilation of the administrative and 
judicial “state-of-the-art” as of 2011. The contributions to the Roundtable show 
that states and their respective judiciaries were hesitant to apply “excessive 
pricing” as a standalone basis for finding violations of competition law. The few 
cases where the doctrine was applied generally involved industries subject to pre-
existing price regulation where the alleged violator acted contrary to the applicable 
regulatory regime.39 There are a limited number of exceptions, but those 
exceptions serve to illustrate the reluctance of judicial authorities to become 
involved in excessive pricing assessments. 
1. The United States 
In their contribution to the OECD Roundtable, U.S. antitrust authorities are 
categorical: 
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and Antitrust Division of 
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) (collectively, “the Agencies”) are 
pleased to provide our perspective on this issue, and explain why U.S. 
antitrust law does not proscribe excessive pricing as an independent 
antitrust violation, although high prices may be indicative of other 
anticompetitive activities.40 
The author of this Article does not quarrel with this characterization by the FTC 
and DOJ representatives, which is supported in their contribution and confirmed 
by independent study of U.S. case law.41 More recent federal court decisions are 
 
38. OECD ROUNDTABLE, supra note 7 (“This document comprises proceedings in the 
original languages of a Roundtable on Excessive Prices held by the Competition Committee 
(Working Party No.2 on Competition and Regulation) in October 2011.”). 
39. Id. at 10–11. 
40. Id. at 299. 
41. See id. at 299–300 (citing Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 
(2009)); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004); 
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consistent with this general line.42 
Perhaps the most quoted judicial pronouncement regarding the notion of 
excessive pricing of recent years is from the late Justice Antonin Scalia’s 2004 
opinion for the Supreme Court in Verizon v. Trinko, stating: 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging 
of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element 
of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at 
least for a short period-is what attracts “business acumen” in the first 
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic 
growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of 
monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by 
an element of anticompetitive conduct.43 
An earlier decision by the Second Circuit in Berkey v. Eastman Kodak is to the 
same effect: “[a] pristine monopolist . . . may charge as high a rate as the market 
will bear.”44 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in Blue Cross v. Marshfield: “[a] natural 
monopolist that acquired and maintained its monopoly without excluding 
competitors by improper means is not guilty of ‘monopolizing’ in violation of the 
Sherman Act . . . and can therefore charge any price that it wants . . . for the 
antitrust laws are not a price-control statute or a public-utility or common-carrier 
rate-regulation statute.”45 
To be clear, the federal courts are not providing a blanket approval of pricing 
practices under U.S. antitrust laws. Price fixing among horizontal competitors 
remains a per se violation of the Sherman Act.46 Resale price maintenance is 
assessed under the rule of reason.47 As the FTC and DOJ point out, high prices 
may well be reflective of an underlying anticompetitive practice, such as abuse of 
monopoly power under Section 2 of the Sherman Act48 or price fixing under 
Section 1.49 Enterprises engaged in abusive behaviors that manifest themselves in 
 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1412–13 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Nat’l 
Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1985)); Ball Mem’l Hosp.,  
Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d  
Cir. 1945); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). 
42. Cf. Batson v. Live Nation Entm’t, 746 F.3d 827, 833 (7th Cir. 2014) (decided under 
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act). 
43. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 
(2004). 
44. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir. 1979). 
45. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing 
Nat’l Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1023–24 (8th Cir. 1985)). 
46. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
47. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 878 (2007). 
48. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other persons or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
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prices higher than competitive market prices violate the antitrust laws. But, neither 
the antitrust authorities nor the courts view high prices as potential antitrust 
violations “as such.” 
There is not much to add in terms of philosophical approach to the few 
quotations laid out above. If a “pristine monopolist,” that is, a monopolist that has 
acquired its dominant position by lawful means, is able to charge a high price, this 
reflects some business acumen or innovation for which the monopolist is entitled 
to be rewarded. The courts are not self-appointed price regulatory authorities. 
They may lack the skill set or technical tools by which to undertake the task of 
price assessment. 
The case of the originator pharmaceutical company with patent and/or 
regulatory marketing exclusivity protection at first glance may appear 
exceptionally insulated from assessment under excessive pricing doctrine because 
the monopoly position is based on congressional authorization (administered by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office or the FDA). That is, unless the patent was 
procured by fraud or other misadventure, or the FDA was somehow taken 
advantage of, the monopoly is “pristine.” But, does this mean that the price 
charged by an originator company for a pharmaceutical product can never “as 
such” violate the antitrust laws (i.e. without an additional element such as price-
fixing with a horizontal competitor)? 
It is important to take notice of the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in 
FTC v. Actavis50 in which it rejected the idea that a patent insulates an originator 
pharmaceutical company from scrutiny under the antitrust laws stating, inter alia: 
“this Court has indicated that patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in 
determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law 
immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”51 In this decision, the Court noted, for 
example, that a price-fixing agreement among patent owners is not insulated from 
antitrust scrutiny because of the monopolies conferred by patents.52 It said: 
 
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
50. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013). 
51. Id. 
52. The Actavis Court stated the following:  
[I]n Line Material, supra, at 308, 310-311, 68 S.Ct. 550, the Court held that 
the antitrust laws forbid a group of patentees, each owning one or more 
patents, to cross-license each other, and, in doing so, to insist that each 
licensee maintain retail prices set collectively by the patent holders. The 
Court was willing to presume that the single-patentee practice approved 
in General Electric was a “reasonable restraint” that “accords with the 
patent monopoly granted by the patent law,” 333 U.S., at 312, 68 S. Ct. 
550, but declined to extend that conclusion to multiple-patentee 
agreements: “As the Sherman Act prohibits agreements to fix prices, any 
arrangement between patentees runs afoul of that prohibition and is 
outside the patent monopoly.” Ibid. In New Wrinkle, 342 U.S., at 378, 72  
S. Ct. 350, the Court held roughly the same, this time in respect to a similar 
arrangement in settlement of a litigation between two patentees, each of 
which contended that its own patent gave it the exclusive right to control 
production. That one or the other company (we may presume) was right 
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[I]n Standard Oil Co. ( Indiana), the Court upheld cross-licensing 
agreements among patentees that settled actual and impending patent 
litigation, [Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 168], 
which agreements set royalty rates to be charged third parties for a license 
to practice all the patents at issue (and which divided resulting revenues). 
But, in doing so, Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, warned that such 
an arrangement would have violated the Sherman Act had the patent 
holders thereby “dominate[d]” the industry and “curtail[ed] the 
manufacture and supply of an unpatented product.” . . . These cases do 
not simply ask whether a hypothetically valid patent’s holder would be 
able to charge, e.g., the high prices that the challenged patent-related term 
allowed. Rather, they seek to accommodate patent and antitrust policies, 
finding challenged terms and conditions unlawful unless patent law 
policy offsets the antitrust law policy strongly favoring competition.53 
The implication of this quoted passage is recognition by the Court that a patent 
ordinarily allows a patent owner to charge “high prices,” but at the same time 
requires that the patent owner not engage in anticompetitive practices to achieve 
that end. 
The Supreme Court has not generally endorsed excessive pricing doctrine, 
and the Actavis decision does not provide that endorsement. At the same time, the 
Court appears to have made clear that should it be approached with a case 
involving application of excessive pricing doctrine and should that case involve a 
patent, the patent will not insulate its owner from analysis under the antitrust 
laws.54 In doing so, given the Court’s generally sympathetic view toward the 
innovation-promoting role of patents, the Court would probably give substantial 
leeway to the patent owner regarding pricing practices, but this does not mean the 
patent owner would be accorded a “blank check.” In other words, the Actavis 
decision indicates that the Court has an open mind on the relationship between 
patents and antitrust law in general. That does not suggest any new approach by 
the Court specifically regarding excessive pricing doctrine.55 
A notable recent decision by the California Supreme Court in In re CIPRO 
Cases I & II,56 is to the same effect regarding patents as Actavis, but under 
 
about its patent did not lead the Court to confer antitrust immunity. Far 
from it, the agreement was found to violate the Sherman Act. Id., at 380, 
72 S. Ct. 350. 
Id. at 2232. 
53. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2232–33. 
54. Id. 
55. The resistance of subordinate courts to placing limitations on drug prices is not to be 
underestimated. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the efforts of 
the District of Columbia to implement a statute precluding excessive pricing of patented drugs, citing 
with favor its prior decision which noted that, with respect to patent exclusivity, “the only limitation 
on the size of the carrot [i.e. the reward of higher prices] should be the dictates of the marketplace.” 
See Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(citing King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
56. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 61 Cal. 4th 116 (2015). 
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California’s antitrust legislation. The California Supreme Court goes a bit further 
than the U.S. Supreme Court in terms of placing a burden on the patentee-
defendant in a reverse payments case to justify its conduct, and perhaps such 
burden-shifting might be useful in an attack on excessive pricing (i.e. requiring the 
originator to justify its pricing practices).57 In other words, if a plaintiff (public or 
private) establishes a prima facie case that a price is excessive, the burden may 
shift to the originator patent owner to justify the price as reasonable.58 
There is no reason in principle why the Sherman Act should not address 
excessive pricing “as such.” In Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, the 
Supreme Court identified the underlying motivation for the Sherman Act: 
[T]he main cause which led to the legislation was the thought that it was 
required by the economic condition of the times; that is, the vast 
accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals, the 
enormous development of corporate organization, the facility for 
combination which such organizations afforded, the fact that the facility 
was being used, and that combinations known as trusts were being 
multiplied, and the widespread impression that their power had been and 
would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally.59 
The object of the Sherman Act was to protect the public from the harm that can 
result from the “oppressive” exercise of monopoly power.60 The motivation was 
not a desire to assure competitive supply chains or to allow businesses to compete 
more fiercely with each other. 
The holder of a patent on a unique and important medicine enjoys a 
monopoly authorized by Congress. But, even though that monopoly may have 
been acquired by lawful means, this does not mean that it may not be used “to 
oppress individuals and injure the public generally.”61 Thus, for example, the 
paradigm case of Gilead’s conduct in pricing Sovaldi. The company consciously 
set out to extract the maximum price at the limits of U.S. budgetary tolerance 
knowing that to do so would restrict access to the drug and knowing that it would 
place severe burdens on state public health budgets. It did not invent the drug. It 
 
57. See id. 
58. While federal antitrust law does not embrace excessive pricing doctrine, there are state 
statutes that provide remedies against abusive pricing. This Article does not address those statutes, 
recognizing that they may play some role in respect to pharmaceutical prices. Moreover, a number of 
U.S. states have taken action to control drug prices through their authority regarding Medicaid 
reimbursement and similar programs. These may be alternatives to antitrust approaches. See, e.g.,  
D.C. CODE § 28-4553 (2005) (barred excessive pricing of patented drugs, but was held 
unconstitutional in Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362 (Fed.  
Cir. 2005)); FLA. STAT. § 409.91195 (2015) (reduces or offsets state expenditures for Medicaid by 
giving savings to citizens and providing benefits to manufacturers placed on the “preferred drug 
list”); 22 ME. STAT. tit. 22, § 2681 (2015) (prohibiting profiteering and excessive pricing by drug 
manufacturers, enforced by civil penalties). 
59. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911) (emphasis added). 
60. JÉRÔME MATHIS & WILFRIED SAND-ZANTMAN, INSTITUT D’ECONOMIE 
INDUSTRIELLE, WELFARE STANDARDS IN COMPETITION POLICY 17 (2015). 
61. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 50. 
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was engaged in virtually pure financial engineering. Should it not under a rule of 
reason be required to justify its pricing to the satisfaction of judge and jury? 
Under conventional Sherman Act doctrine the acquisition of monopoly 
power is not in itself unlawful, nor should it be. Monopolization is only unlawful if 
it is achieved through anticompetitive conduct. But, a monopolist may abuse its 
monopoly power notwithstanding that the monopoly was lawfully acquired. It 
may use its monopoly to suppress competition. In United States v. Microsoft,62 
Microsoft used its monopoly control over a computer operating system to prevent 
the emergence of competing technologies.63 The archetypal bad behavior of the 
monopolist is to flex its power to block competition, thereby enabling it to charge 
a price above a competitive market price and to sustain that price over a period of 
time. 
The originator pharmaceutical company has the power to charge a price 
above a competitive market price (i.e. a generic price) because it is insulated by the 
market exclusivity granted by a patent. It is a lawfully acquired monopoly. This 
does not mean, however, that it should be able to flex its market power without 
attention to the impact on the public. The originator pharmaceutical company has 
the power to cause real injury by the charging of an excessive price. Why should 
that conduct be insulated from antitrust scrutiny? 
This, of course, takes us back to the reluctance of the federal courts, and 
competition authorities more generally, to pursue excessive pricing cases on the 
following grounds: (1) that it is difficult to establish what is a reasonable price and 
therefore to establish what price might be excessive; (2) that the courts are not 
constituted as price control administrators; and (3) that Congress has legislated the 
patent system and has the responsibility for controlling its impact. 
In the second part of this Article, the case will be made that it is indeed 
possible to determine the reasonable price of a pharmaceutical and to establish 
what price may be excessive. This is not an assessment that will be unique to the 
United States. As to the perspective that courts are not price control 
administrators, this view discounts the many ways that court decisions intervene in 
economic affairs in the United States, including by the assessment of royalty levels 
in intellectual property disputes. Given that pharmaceutical originators appear to 
rely on investment bankers for determining the price of their products, as 
witnessed by the Senate staff report on Gilead, there is no good reason why 
federal judges and juries cannot weigh in on pricing as well. Indeed, Congress can 
act to control pharmaceutical prices, but chooses not to do that. However, it has 
not so far attempted to intervene in the implementation of the Sherman Act, and 
the federal courts are routinely developing new doctrines and approaches to 
antitrust matters. The fact that Congress could limit application of the Sherman 
Act does not preclude the courts from taking a new approach with respect to 
 
62. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000). 
63. Id. at 36–37. 
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excessive pricing. Perhaps Congress would welcome action by another branch, 
despite its unwillingness to take action on its own. 
2. The European Union 
The European Union (EU), through the Commission Competition 
Directorate and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), has been 
somewhat more receptive than the United States to the use of excessive pricing as 
a competition law doctrine. Yet, the doctrine has been used in a limited number of 
cases and in a conservative manner. One of the reasons why the EU has been 
more receptive is that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) in its Article 102 regarding abuse of dominant position appears to directly 
identify excessive pricing as a competition law violation, providing: 
Article 102 
(ex Article 82 TEC) Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it 
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it 
may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, 
consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions;64 
Of course, the terminology “unfair” prices is not identical to “excessive” prices, 
but, if anything, the former would appear to establish a lower bar for a violation 
than the latter, since “fairness” can be equated with what reasonable people might 
expect from a transaction, while “excess” is more suggestive of something 
extreme or pushing boundaries. 
The lead case that establishes the current basis of CJEU doctrine regarding 
excessive pricing is United Brands v. Commission decided in 1978.65 In this case, the 
CJEU set out a two-part test for determining whether a price is excessive within 
the meaning of Article 102 (then Article 86 of the European Community 
Treaty).66 The test is elaborated by the Court as follows: 
 
  The imposition by an undertaking in a dominant position directly or 
indirectly of unfair purchase or selling prices is an abuse to which 
exception can be taken under Article 86 [now 102] of the Treaty. 
  It is advisable therefore to ascertain whether the dominant 
undertaking has made use of the opportunities arising out of its dominant 
position in such a way as to reap trading benefits which it would not have 
reaped if there had been normal and sufficiently effective competition. 
 
64. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 102, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 
115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU] (emphasis added). 
65. Case 27/76, United Brands Co. & United Brands Cont’l B.V. v. Comm’n of the European 
Cmtys., 1978 E.C.R. I-207 [hereinafter United Brands Co.]. 
66. TFEU, art. 102. 
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  In this case charging a price which is excessive because it has no 
reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied would be such 
an abuse. 
  This excess could, inter alia, be determined objectively if it were 
possible for it to be calculated by making a comparison between the selling 
price of the product in question and its cost of production, which would disclose 
the amount of the profit margin . . . . 
  The questions therefore to be determined are whether the difference 
between the costs actually incurred and the price actually charged is excessive, and, 
if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, whether a price has been 
imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to competing products.67 
 
 The test as stated by the Court in the final paragraph quoted above is 
somewhat curious. It first asks whether there is too large a spread between cost 
and price, and it goes on to ask whether that price is unfair. This leaves open the 
possibility that there may be an excessive price that is yet fair. This two-part test is 
difficult to meet. In United Brands, the CJEU rejected the Commission’s 
determination of excessive pricing based on inadequacy of evidence, although the 
defendant was found to have engaged in other competition law violations.68 Not 
only must the price be “excessive,” but it must be “unfairly excessive.” 
In Bodson v. Pompes Funèbres,69 a preliminary ruling decided in 1988, the 
CJEU said that differences between prices charged by exclusive funeral home 
concessionaires and those not operating under concession could be used as the 
basis for determining whether the prices charged by the concession holder were 
fair.70 In a preliminary ruling in SACEM,71 an action brought by discotheque 
owners against a French copyright society, the CJEU in 1989 said that significant 
differences in royalty rates charged in France and other EU member states could 
form the basis for an excessive pricing action.72 The Commission successfully 
secured a settlement undertaking in Deutsche Post in 2001 because, inter alia, the 
German postal service had charged mailings coming from the United Kingdom 
excessive surcharges without justification.73 In Port of Helsingborg, a proceeding 
decided by the Commission in 2004, the finding was that excessive prices were 
not charged by a port operator in light of its specific geographic and other 
circumstances.74 In Rambus, based on its preliminary conclusions the Commission 
 
67. United Brands Co., 1978 E.C.R. at 301 ¶¶ 248–52 (emphasis added). 
68. Id. at 285–303. 
69. Case 30/87, Bodson v. Pompes Funèbres des Régions Libérées, 1988 E.C.R. 2481. 
70. Id. 
71. Case 110/88, Lucazeau v. Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs de Musique, 
1989 E.C.R. 2811. 
72. Id. 
73. Commission Decision 36.915, Deutsche Post AG – Interception of Cross Border Mail, 2001 
(EC). 
74. Commission Decision 36.568, Scandlines Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg, 2004 (EC). 
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secured a commitment on the limitation of royalties charged in respect to a 
technical standard.75 This relatively brief summary of CJEU case law and 
Commission action as of 2011, the date of the OECD Roundtable, evidences that 
neither the Commission nor private claimants have commonly pursued 
competition law actions based on excessive pricing doctrine, notwithstanding that 
such actions are expressly contemplated by the terms of the TFEU. It is not self-
evident from the face of the reported decisions or outcomes that there are 
insurmountable hurdles to successfully pursuing excessive pricing cases, yet 
reluctance appears a real phenomenon. 
The OECD Roundtable report by the EU competition authorities 
summarizes the foregoing case history in this way, “The case law . . . shows that 
the Commission and European Courts addressed the question of excessive prices 
only in markets with an entrenched dominant position where entry and expansion 
of competitors could not be expected to ensure effective competition in the 
foreseeable future.”76 
 The EU report for the OECD went on to say: 
In view of the limited experience with cases concerning excessive prices, 
not all questions can be answered at this stage. At the same time, the 
relatively small number of cases that we have been able to deal with, may 
already indicate that addressing excessive prices is an area of antitrust 
where limited and very cautious intervention is warranted.77 
 Other commentators have confirmed that the EU has approached excessive 
pricing doctrine cautiously.78 That said, the EU is more receptive to application of 
excessive pricing doctrine than the United States. The two-part test elaborated by 
the CJEU may set a relatively high bar, but there is the prospect for successfully 
pursuing an excessive pricing action. The Commission has taken a fairly aggressive 
approach toward anticompetitive practices by the originator pharmaceutical 
companies, including those involving patent abuse.79 There may well be an 
opening for competition actions directed specifically towards excessive pricing. 
 
75. Commission Decision 36.636, Rambus, 2009 (EC). 
76. OECD ROUNDTABLE, supra note 7, at 317. 
77. Id. at 321. 
78. See generally Damien Geradin, The Necessary Limits to the Control of “Excessive” Prices by 
Competition Authorities – A View from Europe (Oct. 23, 2007) (unpublished paper), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1022678. 
79. See Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final Report at 532 ( July 8, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
RQG9-ZPFH]. 
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3. Canada and South Africa 
a. Canada 
Canada’s Competition Act expressly identifies the unreasonable 
enhancement of price based on a patent, trademark, copyright, or protected 
integrated circuit design as a violation, providing: 
32. (1) In any case where use has been made of the exclusive rights and 
privileges conferred by one or more patents for invention, by one or 
more trade-marks, by a copyright or by a registered integrated circuit 
topography, so as to . . . 
(c) prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production of any 
such article or commodity or unreasonably enhance the price thereof, . . . 
the Federal Court may make one or more of the orders referred to in 
subsection (2) [including voiding an agreement, preventing carrying out 
of the terms, revoking a patent, the registering other IP forms, or such 
other remedies as deemed necessary] in the circumstances described in 
that subsection.80 
In addition, Canada’s Patented Medicines Price Review Board specifically 
addresses excessive pricing and has the power to order price reductions.81 
 
b. South Africa 
South Africa’s Competition Act82 expressly identifies the charging of an 
excessive price as a competition law violation, providing: 
1. Definitions and interpretation 
(1) In this Act - 
. . . .  
(ix) ‘excessive price’ means a price for a good or service 
which – 
(aa) bears no reasonable relation to the economic value of that good or 
service; and 
(bb) is higher than the value referred to in subparagraph (a);  
. . . . 
8. Abuse of dominance prohibited 
It is prohibited for a dominant firm to – 
(a) charge an excessive price to the detriment of consumers;83 
 
80. Canada Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34 (Can.). 
81. See Joel Lexchin, Drug Pricing in Canada, in PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY, supra note 5, at 25, 25–41. 
82. Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 1 (S. Afr.). 
83. Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
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The South African report for the Roundtable indicates that the excessive pricing 
provision of the Competition Act is based on the two-part test developed by the 
CJEU in the United Brands case.84 
It is noted that there have been six cases brought before the Competition 
Tribunal alleging abuse of dominance by excessive pricing.85 From the standpoint 
of originator pharmaceutical pricing, the most notable is a case initiated before the 
Competition Commission involving access to HIV-AIDS antiretroviral 
medicines.86 The Commission issued a terse determination stating that the patent 
holders of certain antiretroviral medicines had engaged in excessive pricing under 
the Competition Act, had refused access to essential facilities, and had engaged in 
exclusionary conduct.87 It referred the matter to the Competition Tribunal for an 
order granting a compulsory license for the production of generic medicines in 
return for a reasonable royalty.88 The complaint-against companies settled the 
matter by granting voluntary licenses enabling generic production.89 
The South African Competition Commission has successfully secured a 
number of settlement undertakings based on allegations of excessive pricing. The 
report for the OECD Roundtable notes that all but the pharmaceutical case have 
involved former state-owned enterprises.90 In a major case litigated through the 
Competition Tribunal to the Competition Appeals Court (CAC), the CAC rejected 
the methodology used by the Tribunal to establish excessive pricing, holding that 
it did not properly account for long-run equilibrium pricing factors, and referred 
the matter back for further proceedings.91 
4. General Provisions 
The competition laws of most countries make abuse of dominant position an 
offense, and among the types of offense that may be considered are abuses 
relating to price.92 In that regard, a specific legislative provision identifying 
“excessive pricing” or unfair pricing is not a prerequisite to actions involving the 
charging of excessive prices.93 The OECD Roundtable report makes clear that, so 
 
84. See United Brands Co., supra note 65; see also OECD ROUNDTABLE, supra note 7, at  
363 (South Africa). 
85. OECD ROUNDTABLE, supra note 7, at 363–73. 
86. See Jonathan Berger, Market Definition, in USING COMPETITION LAW TO PROMOTE 
ACCESS TO HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR LOW-AND MIDDLE-INCOME 
COUNTRIES  
96, 99–122. 
87. Sean Flynn, Comparative Perspectives Through Country Case Studies, in USING 
COMPETITION LAW TO PROMOTE ACCESS TO HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR 
LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 24. 
88. Id. 
89. OECD ROUNDTABLE, supra note 7, at 363. 
90. Id. at 364. 
91. Id. at 365. 
92. See id. at 317. 
93. See id. at 9. 
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far, excessive pricing doctrine has been used in a limited way, and that competition 
authorities have generally resisted use of the doctrine because of uncertainties 
concerning how it should be applied and how actions will ultimately be reviewed 
by the courts.94 Yet, there is no indication of countries that have rejected the 
doctrine outright, with the possible exception of the United States where, so far, 
the federal courts have not been willing to entertain antitrust actions based on 
excessive pricing “as such,” as compared with excessive prices standing as 
evidence of anticompetitive abuse.95 
This Article is not directed toward price control mechanisms used by 
governments to control pharmaceutical prices that do not involve application of 
competition law. There are many such mechanisms in place around the world and 
a substantial literature addressing those mechanisms.96 
C. The Need for Change 
Because of their long history in developing and applying antitrust and 
competition law, the United States and European Union have been traditionally 
looked to for leadership in the development and application of competition and 
antitrust law. There is, however, a significant movement among emerging markets 
and other developing countries toward developing and applying competition law,97 
and among OECD countries others specifically address excessive pricing in their 
legislation and judicial doctrine.98 This Article encourages the further development 
and application of excessive pricing doctrine among all competition authorities 
and courts. 
Current antitrust doctrine is not well suited to address the pharmaceutical 
sector. It fails to take into account the special characteristics of the sector. 
Originator pharmaceutical products are typically protected by patents that afford a 
statute-based monopoly. U.S. antitrust law ab initio effectively provides an 
exemption for monopolists who acquired their position lawfully. It is not illegal to 
be a monopolist. It is illegal to acquire a monopoly using unlawful means. 
 
94. See id. 
95. David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Excessive Prices: Using Economics to Define  
Administrable Legal Rules 2 (CEMFI, Working Paper No. 0416, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=620402. 
96. See PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 5. 
97. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE ON ANTITRUST IN EMERGING AND 
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES: AFRICA, BRAZIL, CHINA, INDIA, MEXICO, Concurrences Review and 
NYU Law School, New York (2015); AJIT SINGH, Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging 
Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions, in GROWTH & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
(Philip Arestis et al. eds., 2006); OECD, IMPLEMENTING COMPETITION POLICY IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (2007); Bernard Hoekman & Peter Holmes, Competition Policy, Developing Countries and 
the WTO, in 22 WORLD ECON. 6, 875 (2002); cases cited in UNDP, USING COMPETITION LAW TO 
PROMOTE ACCESS TO HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR LOW-AND MIDDLE-INCOME 
COUNTRIES, supra note 12. 
98. See OECD ROUNDTABLE, supra note 7. 
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Monopolists may abuse their power by engaging in practices deemed 
anticompetitive. Generally speaking, charging a high price is not considered 
anticompetitive. In fact, the federal courts have tended to view high prices as pro-
competitive in so far as they encourage market entry by third parties seeking to 
take advantage of the consumer demand for lower-priced versions of the same 
products.99 Thus, a virtuous cycle arises in which attempts to extract producer 
surplus lead to dissipation of that surplus. 
Originator pharmaceutical products protected by patent and regulatory 
marketing exclusivity may reflect circumstances that are not subject to the virtuous 
cycle; or at least not within a timeframe suitable for consumer/patients and public 
health budgets. New drugs that treat previously untreatable diseases, or treat them 
in a significantly better way, will be demanded by patients regardless of their price. 
The drugs are not subject to price elasticity in the same way as virtually any other 
goods. If the maker of a breakthrough television sets a price far above those of 
existing/ordinary television sets, only consumers with high levels of readily 
disposable income will buy them. Others will find a way to manage without better 
TV quality. That is not the case with drugs essential to life and well-being. 
As the courts have pointed out, higher than competitive market prices—
enabled by pharmaceutical patents—provide a basis for continuing investment in 
necessary R&D.100 There are certainly other ways that pharmaceutical R&D could 
be managed and/or encouraged, and there are other ways that R&D takes place. 
But, this Article is not arguing for a change in the basic idea of pharmaceutical 
patents as incentives for R&D. 
Yet, with all that said, there remains the patented pharmaceutical for which 
an excessive price is demanded based on the monopoly granted by the patent. 
Certainly no one would argue that patients should wait until the end of the effect 
of a patent term for treatment—ten or fifteen years depending on the period of 
effective exclusivity. The argument instead is that competing therapies will enter 
the market and bring prices down. So, even in the paradigm case of Sovaldi, prices 
have fallen. But, prices have not fallen so far as to make the therapeutic class 
accessible. Furthermore, the class of hepatitis C antivirals treats a large number of 
patients, providing opportunity for very significant profit even at somewhat lower 
prices. For drugs treating more rare forms of cancer, blood disease, and other 
conditions, prices may fall more slowly even with the introduction of competitive 
therapies. 
What about the cases of generic producers enjoying “effective monopolies” 
because they are the last of the remaining suppliers?101 There are a good number 
of recent incidents of very large price increases involving these circumstances. Is 
 
99. Carole E. Handler & G. Michael Halfenger, High Court Rulings Have Limited Antitrust 
Liability, LAW360 (Aug. 28, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/33552/high-court-
rulings-have-limited-antitrust-liability [https://perma.cc/8T5T-9G49]. 
100. Id. 
101. See sources cited supra note 4. 
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the theory that the public must wait for Congress to legislate against large price 
increases by generic producers? Will that happen? It has not happened yet. Should 
there not be some form of legal action that can be pursued by state health 
authorities, health insurers, and/or the public more generally? Why not excessive 
pricing under the antitrust law? 
The arguments against application of excessive pricing doctrine are 
essentially arguments against government interference in the free market. But, no 
market is “less free” than the pharmaceutical market. It is regulated every step of 
the way, except in the United States with respect to prices. And it is somewhat 
odd to argue that patent owners protected by legislative monopolies are pricing in 
a freely competitive market. It is obvious that they are not. 
In the Trinko case, Justice Scalia was writing in the context of 
telecommunications pricing.102 The telecommunications carrier may be able to 
charge a higher than market price for a limited period of time and that may be a 
suitable reward for telecommunications innovation.103 Call that the genius of the 
free market. But, should we transpose a decision involving telecommunications to 
life-saving pharmaceutical therapies? This is where the problem of the focus on 
supply market characteristics in antitrust law becomes problematic. There may not 
be specific constraints imposed on suppliers of patented pharmaceutical products, 
other than the patents themselves. But the injury to consumers is potentially great, 
and the patent is an obstacle to the consumer as well as to competing suppliers. 
This is not an argument against patents. It is an argument against using 
patents as a basis for charging excessive prices. It is an argument that even in the 
context of patent protected pharmaceuticals there is such a thing as a “reasonable 
price” and, conversely, an “excessive price.” It is an argument in favor of 
returning to the original objective of the Sherman Act: protection of the public. 
That brings us to the second question, is it feasible to determine what 
constitutes a reasonable price? There is much argument by the pharmaceutical 
industry that the cost of developing a new drug is incalculable or, at the least, so 
high that we should not even inquire about how prices are determined. This 
argument does not survive close scrutiny, taking us to Part II of this Article. 
II. THE EXCESSIVE PRICING DETERMINATION 
As the Court of Justice of the European Union concluded in the United 
Brands decision, the logical starting point for determining whether the price of a 
product is unfair is the manufacturer’s cost of making the product.104 Once the 
cost is determined, the differential between cost and price can be identified and a 
determination made as to whether that differential is “excessive.”105 
 
102. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. at 398. 
103. Id. at 398–99. 
104. See United Brands Co., 1978 E.C.R. at 301 ¶ 251. 
105. Id. at 301 ¶ 252. 
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In the case of originator pharmaceutical products, the cost must include the 
R&D that goes into discovery and refinement of the product, including the cost 
of clinical assessment. Because securing marketing approval for a pharmaceutical 
product involves trial and error, account reasonably must be taken of failures 
along the path to success. In other words, the cost of developing and approving a 
new product must include a risk factor. The originator pharmaceutical industry 
suggests that when these factors are taken into account, it is unreasonable to 
inquire as to the cost of a particular new pharmaceutical product. For reasons 
discussed below, this is not a compelling argument. 
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to note at the outset that there are alternative 
methodologies for determining whether a price is excessive, even if those 
methodologies are not as direct as the cost/price methodology. For example, 
governments outside the United States routinely determine what they are willing 
to pay for originator pharmaceutical products based on comparative pricing across 
baskets of countries.106 This is called “reference pricing.” This type of 
methodology has been used by the Court of Justice of the European Union and 
the Commission in assessing prices in various cases, including the Port of 
Helsingborg case.107 While this methodology may provide a relatively 
straightforward and transparent basis for excessive pricing determinations based 
on discrimination across markets, it is not preferable to the cost versus price 
approach. It is entirely possible that the lowest baseline price (or the average) 
among a basket of markets is excessive, not least in the case of originator 
pharmaceutical products.108 
The pharmaceutical industry prefers that discussions about price be based on 
the “value” to healthcare systems in terms of alternatives.109 For example, without 
 
106. See sources cited supra note 5. 
107. Scandlines Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg, Commission of the European 
Communities, 48 ( July 23, 2004). 
108. The most commonly used method of calculating a fair pharmaceutical price is “reference 
pricing.” This involves using the prices from a basket of countries, typically at a similar level of 
development to take into account income levels, in order to determine what might be a general 
market value. This methodology has obvious limitations in terms of ascertaining whether the price in 
a particular market is “excessive” because it assumes that the average price across markets is 
reasonable. In the case of originator pharmaceutical products, where markups are often thousands of 
percent above production costs, the fact that a new drug may be sold for only several thousand 
percent above production costs does not imply that the drug price is reasonable. 
 Nonetheless, to the extent that prices of originator pharmaceutical products in Europe or 
Canada may well be fifty percent lower than prices in the United States, an antitrust inquiry might well 
ask what justifies the price differential. The industry answers the lower price in Europe or Canada 
reflects price controls. But, it also suggests that the originator industry makes a decent profit at the 
lower price, raising the question of why it is necessary to double the price in the United States market. 
In other words, is the price discrimination justifiable? 
109. This may technically be within the discipline of “pharmacoeconomics,” or comparing 
the value of one drug or therapy to another, or may generally look to health economics and the 
overall savings as compared to healthcare alternatives. From the standpoint of a public health system, 
it makes sense to ask whether buying a particular pharmaceutical product will save money as 
compared with alternative patient outcomes in making a determination whether to buy a drug. If 
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treatment by a new drug, a patient would develop symptoms, visit doctors, be 
subject to tests, be admitted to a hospital, become disabled, and potentially die. 
The cost of hospitalization can be quite high, and the price of hospitalization for 
an extended period can run into the millions of dollars. Therefore, in “value” 
terms based on alternatives, even a high-priced medicine may be a “bargain.” 
This type of value assessment is essentially a “hostage” bargaining model.110 
The drug is under the control of the monopoly patent owner, and the price of 
ransoming the drug is whatever the party seeking to obtain it can pay. If the 
ransom is not paid, the consequences may be terrible, and in that regard the 
ransom can be characterized as a bargain. But it is only a bargain because of the 
threat. A similar “value proposition” could be worked out for virtually any 
essential product.111 Water is often “largely free,” but if water is withheld from a 
person for several days, that person will die. In that context, it may seem quite 
reasonable to demand a large payment for water because of its value. But, there is 
no reasonable relationship between the cost of water and the ransom price. 
Indeed, it is possible to spin out any number of scenarios in which the value of a 
product or service might be quite high under the threat of being withheld, but 
only because of the threat.112 That does not make that value reasonable. 
 
purchasing a drug for $100,000 will prevent the expenditure of $2 million in hospitalization costs, it 
makes sense from the health system perspective to purchase the drug. Yet, this really says little about 
whether the $100,000 price for the drug is a reasonable one. If the R&D and production costs 
combined for the drug are $10,000, is it reasonable to pay the originator another $90,000 so that 
profits are enhanced, advertising is increased, executive salaries are boosted, and dividend payouts 
increase? Pharmaceutical originator R&D budgets are about fifteen percent of annual expenditures, so 
some pricing increment should reasonably be added into the pricing equation for future R&D, but 
there remains another eighty five percent to be accounted for. The problem, again, is that from the 
standpoint of the consumer-patient, paying the high price is not optional to the limits of available 
financial resources. The pharmaceutical company prices the drug at a very high level “because it can,” 
not because of financial need. 
110. Michelle Chen, Patents Against People: How Drug Companies Price Patients Out of 
Survival, DISSENT MAG. (Fall 2013), www.dissentmagazine.org/article/patents-against-people-
how-drug-companies-price-patients-out-of-survival [https://perma.cc/864N-46E5]. 
111. See generally Per Skålén et al., Exploring Value Propositions and Service Innovation: A 
Service-Dominant Logic Study, 43 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 137, 137–58 (2015). 
112. This type of question could be posed with respect to any situation in which a consumer 
is confronted with a time-sensitive demand and as to which failure to fulfill the demand may lead to 
substantial adverse consequences. Imagine a consumer preparing to board an airplane to attend an 
important business meeting in a faraway city. An airline representative says, “I am sorry but we 
cannot allow you to board this flight with your current ticket. Our database research shows that you 
are going to present a proposal that may lead to a very large contract for your employer, and we do 
not believe that we are being fairly compensated for our side of getting you to your meeting. So, you 
can only board the aircraft if you agree to pay us ten times the current price of your ticket because the 
value to you of getting to your meeting is much higher than that.” 
 If your intuition is that this is an abusive pricing practice, what is your intuition about a drug 
company that says: “You have a fatal illness. If left untreated, you will be hospitalized for a period of 
months, if not years, attended to by nursing staff and doctors, and prescribed palliative medications. 
This will cost a great deal of money, which either you or your health insurer will pay. So, we have 
decided to charge you for this new medicine an amount somewhat lower than the total cost of the 
Abbott_Final to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/29/2017  10:41 AM 
2016] EXCESSIVE PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES 305 
Another method for determining whether a price is excessive, an alternative 
type of reference pricing, is to compare the prices demanded by originators with 
prices established between monopsony purchasers (e.g., government health 
programs) and monopoly suppliers (i.e., originator suppliers) where such 
procurement arrangements are in place.113 Even though this method does not 
examine the direct costs of creating and producing a drug, it may reveal the “best 
available” bargained price since the monopsony purchaser is presumed to have the 
greatest leverage in negotiations with the supplier. 
This Article focuses on cost/price methodology because it is the most direct 
methodology for determining the profit of the supplier and therefore the most 
reasonable way to determine whether the price is higher than it should be. 
A. The Cost of a Drug 
1. The Present Indeterminate State 
The cost of researching and developing originator pharmaceutical products is 
deliberately shrouded in mystery.114 The originator pharmaceutical industry has 
aggressively resisted providing data regarding its R&D costs. This resistance traces 
back as early as the 1950s U.S. Senate investigations into pharmaceutical pricing in 
 
treatment you would receive if your disease were allowed to progress to its final stage; at which point 
you will die. Under these circumstances, do you not think our price fair?” 
113. Peter Drahos has pointed out that the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme 
considers that a reasonable price may be identified by observing the results of bargaining between a 
monopoly supplier and a monopsony purchaser. Email from Peter Drahos, Professor, Austl. Nat’l 
Univ., to author (Sept. 26, 2015). This is an alternative to a cost-plus approach, and it is a 
methodology for establishing price that has been strongly resisted by the pharmaceutical industry, as 
in the ban on government price negotiating in the U.S. Medicare Part D legislation. JIM HAHN, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33782, FEDERAL DRUG PRICE NEGOTIATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MEDICARE PART D, 1 (2007). Nonetheless, neither a bargaining among monopolists nor a reference 
price approach is likely to yield a price based on the true costs of R&D. This methodology presumes 
that the bargaining power of the monopsony purchaser counterbalances the exclusivity power of the 
monopoly supplier, resulting in a “more fair” price. In the United States, for example, the Veterans 
Administration has typically negotiated substantially lower prices with the originator companies than 
private health insurers because of its very large purchasing power and control patient market. See id. at 
4–5. 
114. See Arthur Daemmrich, U.S. Healthcare Reform and the Pharmaceutical Industry 11–12 
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-015, 2011); Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, 
Demythologizing the High Costs of Pharmaceutical Research, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34, 36–38 (2011); F.M. 
Scherer, R&D Costs and Productivity in Biopharmaceuticals (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research, 
Working Paper Series No. RWP11-046, 2011); F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONS. 1298 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., 2000); MARTIJN 
BROEKHOF, CMTY. RESEARCH CENTRE ECONS., UNIV. OF GRONINGEN, TRANSPARENCY IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A COST ACCOUNTING APPROACH TO THE PRICES OF DRUGS (2002); 
Christopher Paul Adams & Van Vu Brantner, Spending on New Drug Development, 19 HEALTH  
ECON. 130 (2010); Donald W. Light & Joel R. Lexchin, Pharmaceutical Research and Development: 
What Do We Get for All that Money?, BRITISH MED. J., August 2012, at 1, 1–5, http:/www.bmj.com/
content/345/bmj.e4348. 
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the United States,115 has manifested itself in litigation in countries as diverse as 
South Africa and India,116 and continues to this day as reflected in Gilead’s refusal 
to provide R&D data to the U.S. Senate in response to a request from the Finance 
Committee.117 The industry defends its refusal to provide data on various grounds, 
such as problems that would arise from providing data to competitors and 
difficulties of disaggregating costs for particular drugs.118 
Some originator companies in the United States have cooperated with a 
group of academic researchers based at Tufts University in providing select data, 
and the main aggregate numbers used by the Pharma industry to portray the costs 
of new drug R&D are sourced from reports issued by Tufts.119 The methodology 
used by the Tufts-based research team has been criticized on various grounds, 
including for the inclusion of imputed costs of capital (and the rates at which costs 
of capital are calculated).120 In addition, the results are criticized because of a lack 
 
115. See Subcommittee Investigates Drug Prices, in CQ ALMANAC 1960, at 11-743 to 11-749 
(16th ed., 1960), http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal60-880-28173-1331186 [https://perma 
.cc/A6P4-42XQ]. 
116. The author of this Article served as legal consultant to the government of South Africa 
during the litigation brought by thirty-nine originator pharmaceutical companies to challenge 
provisions of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997. During the 
trial before Judge Nwepe of the Pretoria High Court, the government requested that the originator 
companies justify their claim for high antiretroviral prices with data concerning their R&D costs. 
Counsel for the companies refused on grounds that assembling such data would be overly time-
consuming. The case settled shortly thereafter with dismissal of the complaint by the originator 
companies and payment of the government’s legal fees. See Notes of Frederick M. Abbott on Pretoria 
litigation, 2001, (on file with author). 
 The decision by the India Controller of Patents in the matter of the application of the generic 
company Natco for a compulsory license to produce the Bayer cancer drug Nexavar reaffirmed the 
continuing refusal of the originator industry to provide meaningful data with respect to the R&D 
costs on an important treatment. See Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp., Compulsory License 
Application No.1/2011 (Controller of Patents, Mumbai, Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.ipindia.nic 
.in/ipoNew/compulsory_License_12032012.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9PC-7J9N]. Bayer relied on 
general data reported with respect to its overall R&D costs and did not attempt to explain the specific 
methodology by which Nexavar was priced for the Indian market.  
117. See SOVALDI STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. 
118. See BROEKHOF, supra note 114, at 36. 
119. See PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., 2015 BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH 
INDUSTRY PROFILE 13 n.8 (2015) (“It takes at least 10 years and an average of $2.6 billion to develop 
and bring a new FDA-approved medicine to market.”) (citing to the 2014 Tufts data for the 
proposition); JOSEPH A. DIMASI, TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., COST OF 
DEVELOPING A NEW DRUG, slide 8 (Nov. 18, 2014), http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/ 
Tufts_CSDD_briefing_on_RD_cost_study_-_Nov_18,_2014..pdf [hereinafter DIMASI, COST OF 
DEVELOPING A NEW DRUG]; Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 10 J. HEALTH ECONS. 107, 107–08 (1991); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, R&D 
Costs and Returns to New Drug Development: A Review of the Evidence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF THE ECONOMICS OF THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 21, 23 (Patricia M. Danzon & Sean  
Nicholson eds., 2012). 
120. Subsequent to the release of the most recent Tufts study, the Union for Affordable 
Cancer Treatment transmitted a request to the lead author, Joseph DiMasi, Center for the Study of 
Drug Development (Feb. 3, 2015), http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/UACTLetterDiMasi 
_Feb2015.pdf [hereinafter Union for Affordable Cancer Treatment Letter]. For the lead author’s 
response, see Response of Joseph DiMasi, Center for the Study of Drug Development, to Union  
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of transparency regarding the underlying data used by the researchers.121 The most 
recent report of results provides both “out-of-pocket” and “capitalized” cost 
results, so that those objecting to the inclusion of imputed capital costs can view 
the direct expenditure approach.122 The November 2014 Tufts estimate of R&D 
costs for a new prescription drug in 2013 was $2.558 billion using capitalized costs 
and $1.395 billion using out-of-pocket costs.123 
Doctors Without Borders has strongly criticized the results of the Tufts 
study on grounds that it has been demonstrated that new drugs can be developed 
for as little as $50 million, or up to $186 million if you take failure into account. 
Doctors Without Borders observes that “these figures are nowhere near what the 
industry claims is the cost,” including by reference to a leading industry figure 
who has portrayed the higher numbers as mythological.124 At the aggregate level, 
there is a great deal of controversy regarding the cost of developing a new drug. 
That said, the Tufts researchers do not purport to provide cost data regarding 
specific drugs or classes of drugs. 
A major contribution of antitrust/competition litigation directed toward 
excessive pricing would be to require the originator industry to provide concrete 
 
for Affordable Cancer Treatment (Mar. 2, 2015), http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/DiMasi 
_Response_to_UACT.pdf [https://perma.cc/YN2J-WU4K]. See also JAMES LOVE, CONSUMER 
PROJECT ON TECH., EVIDENCE REGARDING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS IN 
INNOVATIVE AND NON-INNOVATIVE MEDICINES, 3–6 (2003); BOB YOUNG & MICHAEL 
SURRUSCO, PUB. CITIZEN, RX R&D MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG INDUSTRY’S R&D 
“SCARE CARD” 2–4 (2001); Steve Morgan et al., The Cost of Drug Development: A Systematic Review, 
100 HEALTH POL’Y 4, 11 (2011). 
121. See, e.g., Union for Affordable Cancer Treatment Letter, supra note 120; Bruce Booth,  
A Billion Here, A Billion There: The Cost of Making a Drug Revisited, FORBES: PHARMA & 
HEALTHCARE, (Nov. 21, 2014, 9:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucebooth/2014/11/ 
21/a-billion-here-a-billion-there-the-cost-of-making-a-drug-revisited/#2715e4857a0b605a33e032ca 
[https://perma.cc/EP53-WCAE]. The methodologies used at Tufts also were the subject of a study 
of pharmaceutical R&D costs by the federal Office of Technology Assessment in 1993, which 
generally supported the methodology used by Tufts. A principal author of the Tufts study was 
included among the experts working on that report. See U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 
OTA-H-522, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS, AND REWARDS (1993). 
122. In the 2014 results, the capitalized costs for a new drug compound are reported at $2.558 
billion, while the out-of-pocket costs are stated at $1.395 billion. See DIMASI, COST OF DEVELOPING 
A NEW DRUG, supra note 119, at slide 21. The large difference explains why critics of the Tufts 
methodology have pointed to the use of capitalized costs as raising serious issues. This author does 
not agree with the inclusion of imputed cost of capital since the originator companies are capitalized 
by equity investors who are bearing the risk of investment, and are not (or do not need to be) 
borrowing money from financial institutions in order to conduct R&D. To this author, inclusion of 
imputed cost of capital effectively double-counts the investment. 
123. Id. 
124. See Rohit Malpani, R&D Cost Estimates: MSF Response to Tufts CSDD Study on Cost  
to Develop a New Drug, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www 
.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/rd-cost-estimates-msf-response-tufts-csdd-study-cost-develop-
new-drug [https://perma.cc/8BLY-AZSX] (“The pharmaceutical industry-supported Tufts Center 
for the Study of Drug Development claims it costs US$2.56 billion to develop a new drug today; but 
if you believe that, you probably also believe the earth is flat. GlaxoSmithKline’s CEO Andrew Witty 
himself says the figure of a billion dollars to develop a drug is a myth; this is used by the industry to 
justify exorbitant prices.”). 
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data regarding the cost of R&D on individual drugs that are subject to assessment. 
To be clear, this does not mean that the methodology for determining whether the 
price of a new drug is excessive should not take into account risk that may be 
associated with failures bearing a reasonable relationship to an individual success. 
2. Access to Data 
Using the United States as an example, it is not clear why greater demand has 
not been made by government authorities for access to direct data regarding the 
cost to industry of developing new pharmaceutical products. This would not be a 
“philosophical question.” The U.S. Government is a major funding source for 
industry R&D (inter alia, directly and indirectly through the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH)), and the federal government is a very significant purchaser of drugs 
from the originator industry (through, inter alia, the Veterans Administration and 
indirectly through its Medicare and Medicaid programs).125 In the early 1980s, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) pursued cost data from the originator 
industry, and the Supreme Court weighed in on the side of the originator 
companies that refused to provide it based on limiting language in the statute 
authorizing certain GAO audits.126 Other statutory authority may be available to 
agencies such as the NIH to investigate drug pricing,127 but agencies have not 
been inclined to use this investigative authority.128 There is no question that 
Congress has the power to subpoena pricing data from the pharmaceutical 
companies. But, Congress has chosen not to use its subpoena power, relying 
instead on less formal “requests.”129 Part of the congressional reluctance appears 
to arise out of conflict between the political parties. However, in connection with 
recent investigations into large price increases by certain generics companies, there 
 
125. See HAHN, supra note 113, at 4. 
126. See Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 844–45 (1983). 
127. For example, NIH could use its authority under the march-in rights provision of the  
Bayh-Dole Act, but has refused to do so. See FRANCIS S. COLLINS, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH,  
OFFICE OF THE DIR., DETERMINATION IN THE CASE OF NORVIR® MANUFACTURED BY ABBVIE 4 
(2013), https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-In-Norvir2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5C8K-H36B]; Michael Mezher, Lawmakers Urge HHS to Exercise ‘March-in’ 
Rights to Fight Higher Drug Costs, REG. AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y ( Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.raps.org/
Regulatory-Focus/News/2016/01/11/23878/Lawmakers-Urge-HHS-to-Exercise-March-in-Rights-
to-Fight-Higher-Drug-Costs/#sthash.1sHX4XKL.dpuf. 
128. The FDA has taken the position that it does not have the authority to investigate  
drug prices and sympathetically refers online inquirers to the Federal Trade Commission. See  
Frequently Asked Questions About Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm082690.htm#5 
[https://perma.cc/835R-WHV6] (last updated Nov. 27, 2015). 
129. While various Congressional committees have conducted inquiries into pharmaceutical 
pricing, including inviting senior pharmaceutical company officials to testify under oath, they have  
not generally subpoenaed documents from pharmaceutical companies. See U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF 
TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-H-522, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS, AND REWARDS (1993). 
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have been federal subpoenas issued by prosecutors, though apparently not 
emanating from Congress.130 
A lack of transparency regarding originator pharmaceutical research is not 
limited to cost data. Independent researchers have for a good number of years 
sought to improve access to clinical trial data for a variety of public-interest 
purposes, such as to verify risks of potential side effects.131 And, in recent years 
there has been considerable controversy regarding apparent conflicts of interest 
with respect to clinical trial “outside” expert reviewers.132 
Lack of access to data regarding R&D costs is a well-known problem. The 
Council of Europe recently adopted a resolution regarding public health and the 
pharmaceutical sector in which it demands greater transparency with respect to 
pharmaceutical R&D expenses.133 The resolution provides, “6.2. with regard to 
research and development for new therapeutic molecules, to: 6.2.1.  oblige 
pharmaceutical companies to ensure absolute transparency regarding the real costs 
of research and development, particularly in relation to the public research 
portion.”134 
In a report prepared by the Rapporteur for the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, concerns about data regarding R&D are echoed.135 
With respect to data, the idea that originator companies do not know their 
R&D costs, including regarding specific drugs or drug candidates, defies common 
sense. Enterprises in this industry must keep track of their expenses. Otherwise, 
 
130. See Cordeiro & Kitamura, supra note 4. 
131. See, e.g., Tracy R. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight of Clinical 
Trials, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, 2007, at 2; Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial 
Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach. Law: From 
Private to Public Good?, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 3, 48–52 (2009). 
132. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL 
RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 101–02 (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field eds., 2009); Ed 
Silverman, Did Researcher Conflicts Influence Evidence for Studies of Flu Drugs?, WALL ST. J.: 
PHARMALOT BLOG, (Oct. 7, 2014, 1:32 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2014/10/07/flu-
drug-study-sees-ties-between-pharm-cos-and-researchers-positive-findings. 
133. EUR. PARL. DOC., Resolution 2071, 30th Sitting (2015) ¶ 1. 
134. Id. 
135.  EUR. PARL. DOC., Public Health and the Interests of the Pharmaceutical Industry: How to 
Guarantee the Primacy of Public Health Interests?, Doc. No. 13869 (2015) ¶¶ 36–37. 
[T]he cost of R&D is somewhat controversial, not only because it is never revealed in 
detail and it is impossible to verify the accuracy of the figures given, but also because often 
it does not take into account public-sector funding and also includes opportunity costs, 
that is what the company could have hoped to obtain by investing elsewhere than in R&D, 
for example on the stock market. As for public-sector research, this was traditionally 
limited to basic research, namely clarifying the mechanisms underpinning diseases and 
identifying promising intervention points. Today it also plays an ever growing role in 
“applied” research, which leads to the discovery of medicines to treat diseases. A study 
published in the United States in 2011 found that in the last 40 years, a total of 153 new 
drugs, vaccines or new indications for existing drugs had been discovered through research 
carried out by public-sector research institutes. More than half of these drugs had been 
used in the treatment or prevention of cancer or infectious diseases. Similarly, in the 
European Union, 44% of innovative medicines recommended for marketing authorisation 
[sic] between 2010 and 2012 originated from small or medium-sized enterprises, academia, 
public bodies and public-private partnerships. 
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planning and budgeting would be infeasible. Company financial planners must 
allocate a certain amount of funding for the various costs involved. It is 
implausible that financial controllers provide “blank checks” to research 
departments and do not examine expenditures. In short, while there may be a level 
of uncertainty regarding R&D costs, for the companies this is not a “black box.” 
In addition, firms in the investment banking and merger and acquisition 
areas have fairly refined analytic tools used to calculate the future expected 
earnings of their subject clients and targets.136 Pfizer may not be inclined to 
provide access to its data to the GAO or to public health NGOs, but it likely 
provides fairly significant access to J.P. Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and 
Morgan Stanley. The Senate Staff Report regarding Gilead and Sovaldi suggests 
that Gilead provided significant amounts of data to its investment bankers and 
pharmaceutical pricing consultants.137 The investment bankers are almost certainly 
under obligations of confidentiality and in any case may not have an interest in 
challenging the cost structures reported by the client/target companies, such as by 
questioning executive salaries, administrative expenditures, legal fees, and the like. 
But, in matters such as mergers and acquisitions, their buying and selling clients 
must take an interest in the cost structure of the businesses involved. The point is 
that while the originator industry may not make its R&D costs available to the 
public or the government at a “granular level,” it may well supply that data to 
others. 
Securing hard data directly from the originator industry is the preferable way 
for determining R&D costs. Nonetheless, there are alternative routes for securing 
relevant data, though perhaps less robust. These include: (1) assessing the cost of 
acquiring R&D and/or business entities engaged in R&D (discussed further 
below); (2) using costs reported to tax authorities; and (3) examining data provided 
to securities exchange officials (e.g., the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission) for public securities filings. 
3. Basic Principles of Cost Assessment 
A determination of the cost of a new drug is only relevant in the excessive 
pricing context if the R&D project has been successful. It is a retrospective 
exercise. Risk and failure are relevant. It is appropriate to account for expenditures 
on reasonably related R&D investments on the path to a successful result. But, 
because establishing cost starts from a known endpoint, it should not involve 
significant speculation. The fact that there may be greater overall risk of R&D in 
the pharmaceutical sector than in some other sectors may justify a higher profit 
 
136. David Biello, Can Math Beat Financial Markets?, SCI. AM., Aug. 16, 2011, http://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/can-math-beat-financial-markets; Gary Stix, Trends in 
Economics: A Calculus of Risk, SCI. AM., Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
trends-in-economics-a-calculus-of-risk. But see Dion Harmon et al., Anticipating Economic Market 
Crises Using Measures of Collective Panic, PLOS ONE, July 2015, at 1, 1. 
137. See SOVALDI STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 13–25. 
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margin with respect to an ultimately approved product, but that margin should still 
bear a reasonable relationship to the enterprise cost of developing it. It should not 
be “excessive.”138 
4. Degrees of Risk 
a. Low Risk 
Companies that invest in projects toward developing new drug therapies 
accept risk across a spectrum of uncertainty. There are very low risk projects in 
which companies develop new delivery mechanisms, new dosages, and improved 
formulations in which there is sufficient existing technology and knowledge of 
human biology to fairly safely predict an outcome.139 Even in such an 
environment there may be failures, otherwise there would be zero risk, but the 
failure probability may be low. In such a circumstance, calculating the cost of 
developing a “new” drug should be fairly straightforward. The allocated budget 
costs of the scientific research team, the research and testing equipment, the 
preclinical and clinical trial costs, and so forth. Most of the new drugs that are 
developed fall within this general category of products.140 This is research with a 
high probability of success, research with a low level of uncertainty, or “low risk” 
research.141 
In the low-risk environment, determining the cost of developing a new 
medicine should not be especially problematic. The level of financial risk may 
depend on the total capitalization of the company undertaking the research. A 
small company that is capitalized at a low level may face a larger financial risk than 
a highly capitalized, large company because a single failure may have more severe 
consequences for the company as a going concern. This is a general risk factor 
with respect to operating a business. 
b. High Risk 
At the other end of the research spectrum there are investments in disease 
treatments involving a large number of unknowns, such as the underlying cause of 
the disease or condition or knowledge concerning the mechanisms for intervening 
in the causal biologic process. If the cause is unknown and the potential 
mechanisms for intervention are unknown, there may be a high level of 
 
138. There are likely to be more and less successful originator companies. Some may go out 
of business as a consequence of R&D failures. But pricing by a single enterprise should not be 
making up for third party losses. Those losses are risks borne by investors and are common to 
seeking returns. 
139. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-49, NEW DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED 
AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS (2006). 
140. See id.; ABBOTT & DUKES, supra note 3, at 62–72. 
141. See Hauke Riesch, Levels of Uncertainty, in ESSENTIALS OF RISK THEORY 29 (Sabine 
Roeser et al. eds., 2013). 
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uncertainty regarding research undertakings and investments and concomitantly a 
higher level of financial risk. This is “high-risk” research. In terms of cost, high-
risk research should generally be expected to be more expensive than low-risk 
research because there are more likely to be avenues that are explored but which 
do not yield commercially viable results. In this regard, determining the cost of 
R&D should include reasonably ancillary efforts of the enterprise that are 
unsuccessful, as well as the successful effort. It should be possible for an 
originator pharmaceutical company to identify the projects that are reasonably 
relevant to the introduction of a successful pharmaceutical product. 
The degree of relevance is something that can be subject to judicial and 
factual assessment, and it may be that there will be some disagreement among 
experts regarding where lines should be drawn. This would not appear to be a 
particularly unusual litigation problem, as accounting for expenditures is 
undertaken in various types of litigation. 
R&D companies may be single focus ventures for which the total R&D 
expenditures may roughly correlate with the R&D expenditures of the company; 
or, the enterprise is undertaking research across a variety of different disease 
targets, types of compounds, or biological substances, i.e. a multi-focus 
enterprise.142 
Within the multi-focus enterprise, the typical R&D department will be 
subdivided either with respect to disease targets and/or mechanism of action 
approaches. It should be possible to segregate from a cost-accounting standpoint 
the expenditures involved in operating a subdivided unit, since presumably for its 
own internal budgetary purposes the enterprise will have determined a budget. 
Again, presuming reasonably efficient use of funds, it may be reasonable to take 
into account the successes and failures of a subdivided unit of a multi-focus 
enterprise in terms of allocating costs of R&D for a successful treatment. 
c. Determining Pricing of Risk 
Pharmaceutical originator companies reduce risk by relying on a broad cross-
section of graduate researchers, hospitals, and small “startup” enterprises to make 
initial progress toward identifying promising drug candidates, then purchasing 
(through one mechanism or another) the promising candidates. Risk can be spread 
by simultaneous investments across a range of projects of different risk profiles. 
To the extent that the originator has purchased the results of graduate 
research, or has purchased a small start-up, this may provide fairly clearly defined 
identifiable cost up to a particular stage of research. 
 
142. Even with respect to a portfolio of promising candidates, it will be difficult to calculate 
the probabilities of any single candidate succeeding as a major revenue contributor. But major 
originator companies have substantial experience managing portfolios. This is in the very nature of 
the financial market assessment of the “product pipeline” of an originator company. The 
sophisticated financial analyst must look at the overall portfolio of the originator company and make 
an assessment of whether there will be successful outcomes, and across what probability spectrum. 
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Originator purchases of smaller R&D-based enterprises with promising drug 
candidates may include a significant “pricing premium” that is paid to the smaller 
enterprise for one or more reasons, including: (1) there may be a competition 
among originator companies for a promising drug candidate; (2) the smaller 
enterprise may be a publicly traded company whose investors expect a premium in 
exchange for tendering control; or (3) the smaller enterprise may be a privately 
held company whose investors expect to receive a significant profit above their 
investment cost. The cost of acquiring a drug candidate through the purchase of a 
smaller enterprise should be evaluated in terms of ordinary cost accounting for the 
R&D expenditures on the part of the smaller enterprise and a reasonable profit on 
the sale, not at whatever price the originator elects to pay.143 Originator companies 
have attempted to justify large, unexpected pricing increases on grounds that they 
have paid substantial premiums for acquisition targets. The public and public 
health budgets should not be reimbursing these premiums to investors through 
the purchase of medicines. 
d. Clinical Trials 
The cost of conducting clinical trials should be capable of determination 
with a relative degree of precision. The originator pharmaceutical industry typically 
identifies the cost of clinical trials as the most significant part of its R&D 
expenditure. Since detailed records are maintained in clinical trials, they should 
facilitate cost allocation. 
e. Production Costs 
The reasonable price of a drug must include production costs. There is no 
argument from the industry that production costs are indeterminate. That said, 
originator patent owner pharmaceutical companies have not traditionally paid 
attention to efficient production because of the high profit margins associated 
with products in which they hold exclusive rights.144 Production processes that are 
grossly inefficient may distort establishment of reasonable prices and might be 
adjusted on that basis. 
 
143. The problem associated with paying high prices for “incubator enterprises” is a recurring 
one. Originator companies justify raising prices on existing drugs, or charging excessive prices for 
newly developed drugs, based on high payments made for the incubators. A related problem is 
recurring in the generics sector where companies such as Valeant have made acquisitions of other 
enterprises and significantly raised prices, justifying the price increases at least in part on the cost of 
acquiring the other enterprises. The U.S. Congress has been somewhat more willing to address price 
increases in the generics sector than in the originator sector, presumably because there is less lobbying 
influence from the generic companies. 
144. FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, INDIAN POLICIES TO PROMOTE LOCAL PRODUCTION OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS AND PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH (World Health Org., 2017) 
(discussing the history of Indian price controls, and identification of inefficient practices). 
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5. Cost to Be Excluded 
a. Government Subsidization 
Because of the high level of uncertainty, basic research regarding underlying 
causes of disease conditions is funded by the government in the United States 
(generally through the National Institutes of Health).145 At very early stages of 
research with high levels of uncertainty, the risk associated with financial 
investment is high because “return on investment” may be sufficiently far in the 
future that business managers are unwilling to commit available investment funds. 
Risk can be reduced by government subsidization of early-stage research. 
In general, research funded by the government should not be included 
within the originator/private-sector cost of developing a new drug. The price 
charged to the public should not be based on recovering government-sponsored 
research funds.146 
b. Tax Benefits 
In a similar vein, tax benefits must be accounted for in the cost of R&D on a 
new drug. If a government provides an R&D tax credit that an enterprise may use 
to offset taxes otherwise payable, that provides a net benefit to the enterprise and 
effectively amounts to a reduction in R&D cost.147 
c. Opportunity Cost of Capital 
As noted in discussion of the Tufts study, the originator pharmaceutical 
industry incorporates opportunity cost of capital as part of its own explanation of 
high R&D costs. It will be up to judges and juries to decide whether it is 
reasonable to include the opportunity cost of capital as part of drug R&D costs. 
Presumably, there will be experts on both sides of this issue. From this author’s 
perspective, incorporating opportunity cost of capital double counts investment 
because capital for R&D is contributed by outside investors and reflected in the 
 
145. See Press Release, Nat’l Inst. of Health, NIH Unveils FY2016–2020 Strategic  
Plan: Detailed Plan Sets Course for Advancing Scientific Discoveries and Human Health  
(Dec. 16, 2015) (on file with author), http://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-unveils- 
fy2016-2020-strategic-plan; NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH-WIDE STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 
2016–2020 (2015). 
146. It may be that the basic research in itself has some indeterminacies in terms of cost to the 
taxpayer, but that indeterminacy should not be relevant to the final cost of R&D to the private sector 
patent owner. 
147. Issues related to taxation of pharmaceutical enterprises are a large-scale problem because 
of the way income shifting is used to avoid tax payment. The avoidance of tax payment in countries 
where pharmaceutical-based income is generated increases the burden regarding public health 
expenditure for the government. Antoine Gara, Pfizer’s Tax Inversion Isn’t a Miracle Drug: Just Ask 
Monsanto and Towers Watson, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2015), http://onforb.es/1lgbVbE. Tax authorities 
are increasingly turning attention to allocation of patent-based income and related tax avoidance. See, 
e.g., Vanessa Houlder, Plans Unveiled to Crack Down on Corporate Tax Avoidance, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 5, 
2015), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/307c921a-6b45-11e5-aca9-d87542bf8673.html. 
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equity share price of the pharmaceutical company. If the company is successful, 
the share price increases, dividends are paid, and the investor may get a return on 
its capital by selling its shares. While an originator company may elect to borrow 
money (i.e. debt) to finance R&D, this is an internal business decision presumably 
reflecting a determination that borrowing money is less costly to the current 
shareholder base (in terms of dilution) than offering and selling additional equity 
securities. As noted above, the inclusion of opportunity cost of capital can double 
the reported R&D costs of the industry. This is clearly a nontrivial issue from the 
standpoint of fairly determining R&D cost and ultimately for excessive pricing 
determinations. 
d. Executive Salaries 
Pharmaceutical originator company executives often earn salaries far in 
excess of what might be considered reasonable. A former CEO of Pfizer, Hank 
McKinnell, who had presided over a precipitous decline in the price of the 
company’s shares with an extensive streak of bad decision-making, was awarded 
over $180 million when he left the company.148 The public and global public 
health budget reimbursed this expense through Pfizer’s pharmaceutical prices. It is 
self-evident that there must be a limit to the level of executive salary that can be 
included in establishing the cost of R&D on a new drug. The amount paid to 
Hank McKinnell is not reasonably related to drug development costs. Of course, 
only a proportionate share of executive salary should be allocated to the relevant 
subdivision in a multifocus enterprise. 
6. Summary 
The foregoing suggests that there are methodologies that can be used to 
calculate with some reasonable precision the cost of R&D on a new drug that 
takes into account the risk of failure. The issue whether the drug provides “value 
for money” in efficacy terms in relation to its R&D cost is a different one. That is, 
for example, whether a public health system should adjust its calculation of a 
reimbursable “reasonable price” with some factor that takes into account the 
patient outcome. An argument can be made that efficacy-based premiums should 
not be paid since the R&D costs are sunk costs and that there is no advantage to 
the patient or consumer from increasing the price because the drug is more 
effective than alternatives. On the other hand, a modest efficacy premium may be 
in the nature of a prize given to a successful venture. 
B. What Is “Excessive”? 
Prices of originator pharmaceutical products typically exceed those of 
generic products by substantial margins. It is not uncommon for generic prices to 
 
148. The Associated Press, Pfizer’s Ex-Chief to Get Full Retirement Package, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 22, 2006, at C2. 
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be five to ten percent of patent-protected originator prices, and the US. GAO 
estimates that generic drugs are, on average, priced seventy five percent lower 
than originator drugs in the United States.149 Originator prices in the order of 
1000% above the later generic prices are not unusual. That is, a $10 price for a 
generic pill may translate into $100 for an equivalent originator pill. The theory 
behind the 1000% multiplier is that the originator must recover its costs of 
research and development, as well as accumulate capital for further R&D.150 
Originator companies do not typically report the prices of their 
pharmaceutical products in relation to their costs of R&D. The ten or twenty 
times the price compared to the generic price does not bear a relationship to 
production cost. A reasonable way to determine whether the price of an originator 
pharmaceutical product is excessive is by comparing it to the cost of research, 
development, and production, and adding some amount for “future R&D.” 
Reasonably, the “normal” price of an originator drug would take the remainder of 
the exclusivity term (by way of example, ten years), calculate the anticipated 
demand for the product over that term (i.e. the potential level of sales), set a price 
that would compensate for the “all in cost,” and derive a price that would return 
the cost plus a reasonable increment to account for future R&D. If a drug was 
determined to cost one billion dollars to develop and produce, and would sell ten 
million units for each of ten years, or 100 million units over a ten-year period, the 
reasonable price of the drug would be ten dollars per pill. Adding a generous $500 
million for future R&D would establish a price per pill of fifteen dollars.151 
If the reasonable price per pill is fifteen dollars, what would be “excessive”? 
If the originator charged thirty dollars, would that be unfairly excessive? What if 
the price was $150 per pill? 
One of the benchmarks used by the CJEU in the United Brands decision was 
how comparable suppliers priced similar products.152 Should it matter that other 
 
149. See Letter from John E. Dicken, Director, Health Care, to Orrin G. Hatch, Senator,  
U.S. Congress ( Jan. 31, 2012) (on file with) (“On average, the retail price of a generic drug is 75 
percent lower than the retail price of a brand-name drug.”). 
150. Nadia Kounang, Pharmaceuticals Cheaper Abroad Because of Regulation, CNN (Sept. 28,  
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/28/health/us-pays-more-for-drugs/ (“According to PhRMA, 
the pharmaceutical trade group, high prices are a reflection of the research and development costs it 
takes to bring a drug to market.”). 
151. Pfizer states that 29 million people in the United States have been prescribed Lipitor. 
About Lipitor, LIPITOR, http://www.lipitor.com/about. (last visited Feb. 21, 2016 at 12:00 p.m.). 
Assuming one pill per day, or 352 pills per year, that would amount to a volume of 10.208 billion pills 
per year. Multiplying that by ten would yield over 102 trillion pills. In 2011, Pfizer earned more than 
$5 billion revenue from sales of Lipitor in the United States. Assuming a ten-year patent term, this 
yields $50 billion over the course of protection. Based on that, the price for Lipitor was about two 
dollars per pill, or about $700 per year for treatment. In fact, it appears that the annual prescription 
price was about $1290 in 2006 up to $2140 in 2012. The spread between the hypothetical price and 
the actual revenue may be attributed to the fact that, while 29 million people were at one point 
prescribed the drug, not all of them maintained a regimen. Alternatively, it may represent the margin 
of the supply chain following sale by Pfizer. In any event, the order of magnitude is comparable. 
152. United Brands Co., 1978 E.C.R. 
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originator pharmaceutical producers charge $150 per pill when a reasonable fair 
price is fifteen dollars per pill? In the context of an industry under scrutiny for 
charging what appear to be unreasonable prices, looking to other providers in the 
industry does not seem to be a logical focal point. 
A similar, but better, approach would be to look to other innovative 
industries where higher than “normal” prices are charged to compensate for 
innovation. It is doubtful that we can find another technology-related industry 
where the spread would be so wide, mainly because pharmaceuticals are subject to 
inelastic demand when discussing necessary treatments. 
This may be a case where courts and juries have to make somewhat 
subjective judgments about what is reasonable. We can venture that charging ten 
times a price that would return R&D, production costs, and a fifty percent future 
R&D increment is “unfairly excessive.” Five times would probably be excessive. Is 
three times excessive? 
The point is that in the cases where pharmaceutical pricing is “stratospheric,” 
a judge or jury may not need a finely tuned methodology for determining when a 
price is unfairly excessive. Taking advantage of the public by charging prices that 
far exceed what is reasonable is excessive. 
C. Remedies 
As the OECD Roundtable notes, another reason why competition law 
authorities and courts hesitate to pursue excessive pricing actions is difficulty in 
crafting appropriate remedies.153 For the United States, an advantage is that 
private litigants with the proper doctrinal tools can seek to recover triple damages 
for antitrust violations.154 A plaintiff representing either a class or a large-volume 
purchaser of originator pharmaceuticals might secure a civil remedy at an order of 
magnitude sufficiently large to persuade the industry to begin to ameliorate its 
pricing. In addition, because violations of the Sherman Act may be criminally 
prosecuted, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission may be 
able to exercise substantial power over pricing decisions by bringing a few 
exemplary cases. 
It does not seem so improbable that a court would fashion a remedy that 
would include future pricing of a pharmaceutical product. Given that the evidence 
would already be available regarding what would constitute a reasonable price, 
using that price as a benchmark should allow court supervision of a pricing order. 
Antitrust and competition cases initiated by government authorities are often 
settled with an agreed-upon remedy. There are various ways that settlement 
agreements could accommodate modification of prices, including establishing 
 
153. OCED ROUNDTABLE, supra note 7, at 321. 
154. For a detailed discussion of available remedies in the United States and elsewhere, see 
Frederick M. Abbott, Anti-Competitive Behaviours and the Remedies Available for Redress, in USING 
COMPETITION LAW TO PROMOTE ACCESS TO HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR  
LOW-AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES, supra note 12, at 58, 84–93. 
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maximum pricing limits, periodic reviews, benchmarking relative pricing, 
extensions of third-party licensing, and so forth.155 
Fully litigated cases typically include injunction against future misconduct, 
and court orders may be tailored to the specific circumstances. It will be 
important for courts to fashion remedies that take into account efforts by parties 
against whom compliance orders are directed to circumvent pricing restrictions, 
for example by transferring assets to other entities, developing minor 
modifications of products subject to order and relabeling, licensing to third 
parties, and other alternative strategies. 
In a more proactive sense, remedial orders could include distribution of 
excessive pricing profits to purchasers, including healthcare plans and individual 
patients and consumers. 
III. COMPETITION LAW FROM THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
This Article has mainly focused on doctrinal development in the United 
States and European Union. With a long history of competition law and policy 
evolution, competition authorities and courts in these countries/regions have 
traditionally been looked to by competition authorities around the world for 
leadership. 
As emerging market and other developing countries have taken on greater 
roles in the international economy, and are catching up with the United States and 
EU in terms of legal infrastructure development, a more level relationship in terms 
of competition policy development and implementation is coming about. It is not 
an overnight process. Nonetheless, there is increasing use of competition law in 
emerging markets and developing countries and recognition that the policies best 
suited to these countries/regions may not be precisely the same as those for the 
United States and EU. 
The business community in the United States and U.S. competition 
authorities have long resisted the negotiation of multilateral competition rules.156 
The business community because of a self-interest in avoiding regulation; the 
competition authorities because of a desire to retain the capacity to adapt policy 
and law as circumstances warrant. Today, the calculus by the business community 
is changing as emerging market and other developing country competition 
authorities are exercising their enforcement powers. This change in calculus is 
reflected in a report by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce regarding China’s 
 
155. Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147, 150 (2005) (stating 
that the Department of Justice Antitrust Division has “leeway in choosing antitrust remedies”). See 
generally C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to 
Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 674–76 (2009). 
156. See Abbott, Public Policy and Global Technological Integration, supra note 12. 
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competition law and policy that finds difficulty in identifying substantive 
multilateral rules that might constrain China’s authorities.157 
United States antitrust jurisprudence has resisted the incorporation of 
excessive pricing doctrine for reasons discussed earlier. This Article argues that 
this resistance is misplaced and that it should be rethought, particularly in the 
context of subject matter where monopoly power is entrenched and likely to 
persist, such as when conferred by patent and regulatory market exclusivity. 
Excessive pricing doctrine is needed for the protection of the consumer and the 
public health budget. Pharmaceutical pricing by originator companies has gotten 
out of hand, and legislators have been slow to react. Public and private antitrust 
plaintiffs can assume the role of protectors of the public interest. 
But, even if the United States retains its entrenched position resisting 
excessive pricing doctrine, this does not stand in the way of its evolution and 
application in other jurisdictions, including the European Union and the rest of 
the world. The United States is an outlier in respect to control of pharmaceutical 
prices, one of the few—and perhaps only158—countries where originator 
pharmaceutical companies are permitted to charge whatever price the market will 
bear. Other countries and regions start from a step ahead in this arena. 
Because competition law today is lightly regulated at the multilateral level, 
countries have substantial flexibility in developing and implementing policy, 
including with respect to excessive pricing. For this reason, among others, there is 
substantial risk involved in the potential pursuit of common multilateral rules that 
would be sought by U.S. industry with a view toward limiting competition law 
controls. 
The policy prescription of this Article is twofold: first, the United States 
should incorporate excessive pricing doctrine in its antitrust arsenal; and second, 
other countries should maintain the status quo with respect to multilateral 
competition rules that allow them flexibility to develop and refine doctrine, 
including excessive pricing doctrine, that is best suited to their circumstances and 
interests. 
The economic and institutional mechanisms under which new drugs are 
developed and distributed in the United States, and globally, are not the result of 
some “optimal planning exercise” that assessed the most effective ways to 
encourage meaningful innovation with a view toward maximizing access for 
patients. The existing “modern” architecture, in the United States and globally, 
evolved over decades based on pushes and pulls from disparate stakeholders, 
reaction to military conflict and public health emergency, developments in the 
 
157. See id.; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMPETING INTERESTS IN CHINA’S 
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT: CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW APPLICATION AND  
THE ROLE OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY (2014), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/
aml_final_090814_final_locked.pdf. 
158. With the world community composed of more than two hundred countries, it is always 
difficult to make categorical generalizations about the rules followed “everywhere.” 
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sciences, changes in public perceptions and expectations, negotiation of trade and 
investment rules, and changes in the way capital markets operate. There is 
continuous demand for reform of the existing architecture, and there is 
continuous resistance to reform. While incremental changes are made at the 
margins, there is reason to be cautious about expectations for profound reform in 
the United States and globally, at least for the near term. In the meantime, patient 
groups and public health systems must deal with the reality they face. This reality 
includes the excessive pricing of critical drug treatments. Competition law is an 
important tool that can be used to constrain excessive pricing. It can and should 
be used to deal with the very real problems that are confronting the United States 
and other countries in terms of pharmaceutical prices. Competition law is not a 
substitute for reform of the architecture under which new drugs are developed 
and supplied in the United States and globally. It is a means to help assure that the 
existing architecture is not abused. 
